University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 1 Annual Survey 2006

Article 13

11-1-2006

Real Estate Law
Paul H. Davenport
Hirschler Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia.

Lindsey H. Dobbs
Hirschler Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Contracts Commons, Land Use Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real
Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Paul H. Davenport & Lindsey H. Dobbs, Real Estate Law, 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 257 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol41/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

REAL ESTATE LAW
Paul H. Davenport *
Lindsey H. Dobbs **

I. INTRODUCTION

This article surveys significant cases concerning real property
law decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia between the spring
of 2004 and the spring of 2006. This article also details significant
legislative changes flowing from the 2005 and 2006 Virginia General Assembly sessions.
II. RECENT CASE LAW
A. Easements
In United States v. Blackman,' the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the following certified question from the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia: "In Virginia in
1973, would a conveyance of a negative easement in gross by a
private property owner to a private party for the purpose of land
conservation and historic preservation be valid?"2 Peter Blackman was the owner of a manor home affected by said negative
easement, which provided that his home was to be "maintained
and preserved in its present state as nearly as practicable" so as
not to "fundamentally alter its historic character."3 Wanting to
renovate and add on to his manor home, Blackman sought to in-

*
Partner, Hirschler Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1982, Roanoke College;
J.D., 1985, University of Virginia School of Law.
** Associate, Hirschler Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 2002, University of Virginia; J.D., 2005, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. 270 Va. 68, 613 S.E.2d 442 (2005).
2. Id. at 72, 613 S.E.2d at 443.
3. Id. at 74, 613 S.E.2d at 444.
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validate the easement because, at the time of its purported creation, the easement would not have been recognized under Virginia law. 4 The court stated that:
Underlying the issue is a degree of apparent conflict between the
common law preference for unrestricted rights of ownership of real
property and the public policy of this Commonwealth as expressed in
Article XI of the Constitution of Virginia, ratified by the people of
this Commonwealth in 1970, that "it shall be the policy of this
Com5
monwealth to conserve. . . its historical sites and buildings."

Reiterating its words from long ago, the court reminded us
that:
An easement is "a privilege without profit, which the owner of one
tenement has a right to enjoy in respect of that tenement in or over
the tenement of another person; by reason whereof the latter is obligated to suffer, or refrain from doing something on his own tenement
for the advantage of the former."6

Recognizing the significance of its answer to the certified question, the court noted the potential impact thereof on "other charitable entities [that] hold conservation or historic preservation
easements."' Ultimately reconciling the conflict in favor of the
commonwealth's strong public policies, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Virginia law did recognize negative easements in
gross for land conservation and historic preservation in 1973.
The court explained:
Virginia not only was committed to encouraging and supporting land
conservation and the preservation of historic sites and buildings in
the Commonwealth, as evidenced by the constitutional and statutory
expressions of that public policy . . . but also recognized negative
easements in gross created for these purposes as valid in 1973.

In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Northern Virginia Regional
Park Authority, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether a utility company held an exclusive easement in gross

4. Id. at 74-75, 613 S.E.2d at 444-45.
5. Id. at 76, 613 S.E.2d at 445 (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1).
6. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Amstutz v. Everett Jones Lumber Corp.,
268 Va. 551, 559, 604 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2004)).
7. Id. at 75, 613 S.E.2d at 445.
8. Id. at 82, 613 S.E.2d at 449.
9. Id. at 81-82, 613 S.E.2d at 449.
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over a bike trail in northern Virginia such that it could properly
apportion use of the easement to third parties without the grant
of a license by the servient landowner.'° The instrument reserving the easement to the power company included the following
language: "'[T]he Authority will not permit, assign or grant any
other party any easements, rights, privileges or encroachments of
any nature on the land hereby conveyed, without the written approval of [Virginia Power], provided such approval shall not be
withheld unreasonably.""'
The parties to the suit agreed that the easement was in gross,
or an "'easement with a servient estate but no dominant estate.""' 2 However, the Park Authority argued the easement was
non-exclusive, whereas the power company purported that it was
exclusive.1 3 The court explained the difference by stating that
"'[a]n exclusive easement in gross is one which gives the owner
the sole privilege of making the uses authorized by it"".4 such that
"the owner of the easement may have the right of apportionment,
which is described as one of 'so dividing [an easement in gross] as
to produce independent uses or operations.' 15 In contrast, a nonexclusive easement in gross .'is one which does not give, as
against the owner of the servient tenement and others who may
be privileged under him, the sole privilege of making the use authorized by the easement.'"'6
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the easement in gross
was non-exclusive and, therefore, its holder could not apportion
the easement to third parties. '" "The clear language," according to
the court, "permitting the Park Authority to grant third party
easements 'of any nature' subject to approval by Virginia Power,
which shall not be unreasonably withheld, demonstrates the non8
exclusivity of Virginia Power's easement."

10. 270 Va. 309, 618 S.E.2d 323 (2005).
11. Id. at 313, 618 S.E.2d at 325.
12. Id. at 316, 618 S.E.2d at 327 (quoting Corbett v. Ruben, 223 Va. 468, 472, 290
S.E.2d 847, 849 (1982)).
13. Id. at 317, 618 S.E.2d at 327.
14. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 493 cmt. c (1944)).
15. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hise v. BARC Elec. Coop., 254 Va. 341, 344-45,
492 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1997)).
16. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 493 cmt. d (1944)).
17. Id. at 321, 618 S.E.2d at 329.
18. Id. at 320-21, 618 S.E.2d at 329.
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Justice Koontz, with whom Senior Justice Stephensen joined,
dissented, reasoning that:
Virginia Power retained an easement in gross that permitted it to
use its easement, among other things, expressly for communication
purposes. The Park Authority, however, was expressly prohibited
from granting "any easements, rights, privileges or encroachments of
any nature on the property" without the approval of Virginia Power.
And neither party disputes the fact that apportionability increases
the value of the easement to its owner, Virginia Power. Under such
circumstances, there is an inference in the usual case that the easement was intended in its creation to be apportionable. Nothing in the
language of the various deeds under consideration refutes that inference here. 19

B. Adverse Possession and Prescription
The element of hostility was at issue in the claim for adverse
possession examined in the case of Quatannens v. Tyrrell.2 ° The
Supreme Court of Virginia had previously held that "'[t]o establish title to real property by adverse possession, a claimant must
prove actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous possession, under a claim of right, for the statutory period of 15 years'
by clear and convincing evidence.2 1 In Quatannens, adjacent
landowners disputed ownership of a strip of land between their
homes which included a small portion of the claimant's home,

brick walkway, paved parking area, and brick arch.2 2 The defendants argued that, because the plaintiffs testified that they did
not intend to possess any property other than their own, their
possession could not be deemed hostile.2 3
The court found this fact "irrelevant," and stated:
The collateral question whether the possessor would have claimed title, claimed the land as his own, had he believed that the land involved did not belong to him, but to another, that is, had he not been
mistaken as to the true boundary line called for in his chain of title,

19. Id. at 324, 618 S.E.2d at 331 (Koontz, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
20.

268 Va. 360, 364-65, 601 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2004).

21.

Id. at 368, 601 S.E.2d at 620 (quoting Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 61, 400

S.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1991)).

22.
23.

Id. at 364, 601 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 365, 601 S.E.2d at 618.
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is not the proximate but an antecedent
question, which is irrelevant
24
and serves only to confuse ideas.

Furthermore, permission is a defense against adverse possession, and, thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof thereof.25
Because the Tyrrells failed to carry this burden, and in fact provided no evidence of permission, and because the Quantannenses
otherwise sufficiently established the elements of a claim for adverse possession, the supreme court held in favor of adverse possession. "A claimant cannot be expected to prove the nonexistence of permission by evidence," noted the court.27
In Amstutz v. Everett Jones Lumber Corp.,25 the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether certain timber growers had
engaged in continuous use of a road such that they had acquired
a prescriptive easement. Mary Ann and David Amstutz
("Amstutz"), the owners of the purportedly servient tenement,
blocked the road, and a lumber company sought to have Amstutz
enjoined from interfering with its use thereof.2 9 Amstutz then
sought a declaratory judgment that another neighboring landowner, Elizabeth Thomas, did not have the right to use the road;
the two cases were combined by the circuit court. 30 The commissioner in chancery determined that the elements of a prescriptive
easement had been met and that "each [of those claiming the prescriptive easement] had utilized the 'road over the Amstutz parcel
when needed' to tend and harvest their respective tracts of timber. 3 1
The supreme court looked to the meaning of "continuous use"
to determine if there was credible evidence to support the chancellor's finding.3 2 The court explained that a continuous use does
"not need to be 'daily, weekly, or even monthly.' 33 Further expanding upon the definition, the court continued:

24. Id. at 373, 601 S.E.2d at 622 (quoting Christian v. Bulbeck, 120 Va. 74, 111, 90
S.E. 661, 672 (1916)).
25. Id., 601 S.E.2d at 623.
26. Id. at 374, 601 S.E.2d at 623.
27. Id.
28. 268 Va. 551, 604 S.E.2d 437 (2004).
29. Id. at 554, 604 S.E.2d at 438.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 555, 604 S.E.2d at 439.
32. See id. at 559, 604 S.E.2d at 441.
33. Id. at 560, 604 S.E.2d at 442 (quoting Ward v. Harper, 234 Va. 68, 72, 360 S.E.2d
179, 182 (1987)).
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Instead, to determine continuity, "the nature of the easement and
the land it serves, as well as the character of the activity must be
considered." The use must "be of such frequency and continuity as to
give reasonable notice to
34 the landowner that [such a] right is being
exercised against him."

Amstutz argued that no notice arose from "the infrequent use
of the disputed road to access the . . . parcels for purposes of
checking timber growth, preparing reports, and marking boundaries. '3 5 On the other hand, those claiming prescription argued
"that the road was used 'as needed' to facilitate the growth, management, and harvest of timber on their respective parcels" and
that "there was no access to either parcel other than by traveling
on the road in question." 36 Holding that there was no credible evidence to support the finding of a prescriptive easement, but that
there was only "sporadic use" of the road, the court reversed the
commissioner's finding. 37 The "'law is jealous of a claim to an
easement,"' 3' remarked the court, and "[t]hat is so because 'the
imposition of a prescriptive easement is the taking of a property
right of the servient owner without payment of compensation."'3 9
C. Real Property Taxation
In Shoosmith Bros., Inc. v. County of Chesterfield,4 the plaintiff challenged Chesterfield County's assessment of its real property. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that in reviewing the
case, it must presume the assessment correct. 41 It is the taxpayer's burden to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence, if the property is assessed above its fair market
value. 42 In the instant case, the County's valuation of the property was based in part on certain non-transferable landfill permits and the income generated as a result thereof.4 3 The plaintiff

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
877, 71
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 441.
Id., 604 S.E.2d at 441-42.
Id. at 561, 604 S.E.2d at 442.
Id. at 562, 604 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting Eagle Lodge, Inc. v. Hofmeyer, 193 Va. 864,
S.E.2d 195, 202 (1952)).
Id. (quoting McNeil v. Kingrey, 237 Va. 400, 406, 377 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1989)).
268 Va. 241, 601 S.E.2d 641 (2004).
Id. at 245, 601 S.E.2d at 643.
Id.
Id. at 246, 601 S.E.2d at 643-44.
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argued that in taking the permits into account, Chesterfield
County, in essence, assessed the permits, as intangible assets,
themselves; therefore, the property was improperly assessed at
higher than its fair market value.44 The supreme court disagreed,
holding that "consideration of the use of the land in assessing fair
market value, even if such use requires non-transferable governmental permits, is not the assessment of an intangible asset," and
affirmed the county's assessment.4 5 It is a "'fundamental rule,"'
stated the court, "'that in assessing all tangible properties for tax
purposes such properties should be assessed at their highest and
best use."'4 6
In City of Martinsville v. Commonwealth Boulevard Associates,
LLC,4 7 the taxpayer fared better. At the trial court level, the taxpayer argued successfully for relief from an annual levy of taxes
for a tract of land containing an industrial plant, which levy was
based on a general reassessment conducted when the plant was
active.4" Since the assessment, the plant's owner declared bankruptcy, the plant was "essentially gutted," and the plaintiff owner
purchased the plant for a mere fraction of its previously assessed
value.4 9 In addition, the City had conducted a new general reassessment, which valued the property at approximately one-third
of the previous assessment, but continued to levy taxes on the
plant based upon the previous assessment. °
The new owner argued that the assessment was erroneous,
while the City argued that "a taxpayer seeking relief from taxes
levied in the interim must prove that the previous general reassessment was erroneous when originally made."5 ' In this case,
however, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that no such contention was made by the taxpayer. 2 The court set forth the following rule of law:

44. See id., 601 S.E.2d at 643.
45. Id. at 247, 601 S.E.2d at 644.
46. Id. at 246, 601 S.E.2d at 644 (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 692, 699, 179 S.E.2d 623, 628 (1971)).
47. 268 Va. 697, 604 S.E.2d 69 (2004).
48. Id. at 698, 604 S.E.2d at 70.
49. Id. at 699, 604 S.E.2d at 70.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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A taxpayer is entitled to relief under Code § 58.1-3984 if he carries
his burden of proving that in either the general reassessment or in
the annual levy of taxes "the property in question is valued at more
than its fair market value or that the assessment is not uniform in
its application, or that the assessment is otherwise invalid or illegal."

Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's reduction of the
assessment
in accordance with the fair market value of the prop54
erty.
D. Contracts
In Cangiano v. LSH Building Co.,55 the Supreme Court of Virginia sought to determine whether the trial court's grant of specific performance and award of attorney's fees was proper. LSH
Building and Salvatore Cangiano entered into an agreement for
the purchase and sale of certain real property.5 6 Cangiano, the
seller, warranted and represented "'to the best of his knowledge
and belief" that he would obtain, and transfer at settlement, certain additional land and easements for offsite utilities and improvements, inter alia, necessary for LSH Building's planned development of the property. 57 The agreement provided that, upon
Cangiano's default thereunder, LSH "'shall be entitled to all
remedies available to LSH at law or in equity, including specific
performance, all of such remedies shall be cumulative and not exclusive of each other' and that any "'defaulting party shall be liable for all costs incurred by the non-defaulting party in enforcing
[the] Agreement through court action or otherwise, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."'5 8 Of course, the "'decision whether to
award specific performance"'5 9 and the "amount of recoverable attorney's fees" both rest within the sound discretion of the trial
court, as the supreme court reminded us.60

53. Id. at 700, 604 S.E.2d at 71 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984 (Repl. Vol. 2004 &
Cum.Supp. 2006)).
54. Id.
55. 271 Va. 171, 623 S.E.2d 889 (2006).
56. Id. at 174, 623 S.E.2d at 891.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 175, 623 S.E.2d at 891-92.
59. Id. at 179, 623 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Shepherd v. Davis, 265 Va. 108, 124, 574
S.E.2d 514, 523 (2003)).
60. Id. (citing Coady v. Strategic Res., Inc., 258 Va. 12, 18, 515 S.E.2d 273, 276
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Cangiano made numerous arguments against the imposition of
specific performance, among them that he was only obligated to
secure such easements as were necessary for the first phase of
development and that the agreement was unenforceable "because
there was neither a meeting of the minds nor an offer and acceptance."6" "In this concession," reasoned the court, "Cangiano implicitly agreed that the language is that of contractual obligation.
He merely contested the scope of the obligation."62 The court held
that "[a] party may not approbate and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory."63 Affirming
the trial court's judgment, the supreme court held that the award
of specific performance in this instance did not constitute an
abuse of discretion and that the parties' agreement "unambiguously impose[d]" the "affirmative obligation" on Cangiano to use
best efforts to secure additional land and easements. 4
Cangiano also challenged the trial court's award of attorneys'
fees because "they were 400% greater than those he incurred."6 5
The court found this argument to be without merit, stating that:
In assessing the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the issue is not
how the fees incurred by one party compare directly with those incurred by an opponent. Instead, the issue is "whether the fees incurred were consistent with those generally charged for similar services" and "whether the services were necessary and appropriate."66

The supreme court found that Cangiano had not proven that
the trial court abused its discretion, and it therefore affirmed the
award, also remanding the case for determination of additional,
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by LSH Building in defending
the judgment on appeal and remand.6 7
Justice Koontz dissented. While he conceded that "[tihe majority correctly acknowledges 'that equity will not compel that which
is impossible to perform,"' he went on to note that "in the applica(1999)).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 176, 623 S.E.2d at 892.
Id. at 181, 623 S.E.2d at 895.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183, 623 S.E.2d at 896.

66. Id. (quoting Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623, 499 S.E.2d 829, 833
(1998)).
67. Id. at 184, 623 S.E.2d at 897.
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ble context of this case [this] is merely another way of saying that
equity will not require a seller to convey land which he does not
own."6" Justice Koontz believed that the majority's resolution, requiring Cangiano to use his "best efforts" to secure the necessary
easements, is no resolution at all, and that because it leaves "future litigation a probable expectation," specific performance was
not appropriate.6 9 Justice Koontz perceived the problem as a deficiency of title that would have been better addressed through an
abatement of the purchase price.7 o
In Forbes v. Rapp,7 the Supreme Court of Virginia sought to
determine whether the chancellor erred in "awarding damages to
a property owner for breach of a contract for the sale of land offered at public auction."7 2 Bruce Forbes was the highest bidder at
an auction of Raymond Rapp's land. " Following the bidding process, Forbes made a deposit on the property and signed a document acknowledging that he would purchase the land, with settlement occurring on or before a certain day, subject to penalties
for the delay of settlement; he subsequently sought to withdraw
his offer to purchase the property.7 4 The supreme court quoted
the chancellor's finding that "Forbes's conduct after the auction
'was a continual pattern of acting in bad faith.' 7
The chancellor awarded Rapp the difference between Forbes's
bid (the contract purchase price) and the fair market value of the
property, plus interest.7 6 Forbes argued on appeal that the chancellor's damage award was improper because Rapp failed to mitigate damages by not holding another auction.7 7 In response to his
argument, the court laid out the applicable rules of law as follows:
We have long recognized the obligation of an injured party to mitigate damages. Thus, when a purchaser has breached a contract for
the sale of real estate, the seller nonetheless has the duty of making
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages resulting from the breach,

68. Id. at 185, 623 S.E.2d at 897 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 186-87, 623 S.E.2d at 898 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 186, 623 S.E.2d at 898 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
71.
72.

269 Va. 374, 611 S.E.2d 592 (2005).
Id. at 376, 611 S.E.2d at 593.

73. Id. at 377, 611 S.E.2d at 593.
74. Id., 611 S.E.2d at 594.
75. Id. at 379, 611 S.E.2d at 595.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
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and to the extent that the seller fails to do so, he may not recover the
additional damages incurred.78

As failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense, Forbes
bore the burden of proof.79 As a result of Forbes's failure "to present any evidence that marketing the property in the manner he
advocated would have resulted in a higher purchase price for the
property,""° the supreme court affirmed the chancellor's damage
award. 8 '
E. Property Owners'Associationsand Condominiums
In White v.Boundary Ass'n," members of a property owners'
association challenged their board of directors' assignment of
parking spaces for exclusive use by certain designated units. The
Whites lived in a nine-unit townhouse subdivision in Williamsburg.83 The subdivision's eighteen parking spaces constituted
common area under the applicable declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions.84 The declaration provided every unit
owner an appurtenant "'right and easement of enjoyment in and
to the Common Area,"' which were to "'pass with the title to every
lot."'85 The board of directors was empowered to adopt rules and
regulations pursuant to the association's bylaws.86 The Whites
claimed the board exceeded its authority under the Virginia
Property Owners' Association Act 8 7 and also expressly violated
the declaration by designating the parking spaces, which in essence amounted to a licensing of common area.88
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the declaration
expressly granted an easement of enjoyment in the common area
to each unit owner and that any rule or regulation which had the
effect of divesting a unit owner of the aforesaid property right

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 380, 611 S.E.2d at 595.
Id., 611 S.E.2d at 596.
Id.
Id. at 382, 611 S.E.2d at 597.
271 Va. 50, 624 S.E.2d 5 (2006).
Id. at 52, 624 S.E.2d at 6.
Id. at 52-53, 624 S.E.2d at 6-7.
Id., 624 S.E.2d at 7.
Id. at 52, 624 S.E.2d at 7.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-508 to -516 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
White, 271 Va. at 53-54, 624 S.E.2d at 8.
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was invalid. 9 Holding the board's parking designation to be invalid, the supreme court explained its reasoning as follows:
[Tihe Board's parking policy confers a license on the individual unit
owners, granting a special privilege permitting them to exclude others from using assigned portions of the common area. Because the
Declaration does not authorize the Board to license portions of the
common area, the Board was not permitted to obtain the same result
by a rule or regulation that effectively divested the unit owners of
of the common area included in their
access to certain portions
90
easement of enjoyment.

The court awarded the complaining unit owners attorneys' fees
and costs as the prevailing party pursuant to Virginia Code section 55-515(A). 91
Westgate at Williamsburg Condominium Ass'n v. Philip
Richardson Co. 92 presented the Supreme Court of Virginia with
the opportunity to clarify the definition of a "scrivener's error" as
that term appears in the Condominium Act.9 3 Virginia Code section 55-79.71(A) provides, "If there is no unit owner other than
the declarant, the declarant may unilaterally amend the condominium instruments," but pursuant to Virginia Code section 5579.71(B), if "there is any unit owner other than the declarant, the
condominium instruments shall be amended only by agreement of
the unit owners" or by the declarant unilaterally to correct a
scrivener's error under section 55-79.71(F).9 4
When the developer acquired the property upon which the condominium was ultimately built, it purchased a larger tract than it
needed for ease of securing subdivision approval and so as not to
delay closing.95 The developer and its seller fully intended that a
smaller portion of the property would eventually be re-conveyed
to the seller. 96 The metes and bounds description included in the
declaration creating the condominium encompassed the smaller
portion, contrary to the intention of the developer, who, upon realization of the oversight, unilaterally recorded a corrective

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 55, 624 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 56, 624 S.E.2d at 9.
Id. at 57, 624 S.E.2d at 9.
270 Va. 566, 621 S.E.2d 114 (2005).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
Id. § 55-79.71(A), (B), (F) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
Westgate, 270 Va. at 569-70, 621 S.E.2d at 115.
See id. at 570, 621 S.E.2d at 115.
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amendment to the declaration to remove the small parcel.9 7 The
association then sought to quiet title.9
The court set out to determine whether a scrivener's error had
occurred in this case, a question of law which the court reviewed
de novo. Though the court did not adopt a definition for the
term "scrivener's error" as used in Virginia Code section 5579.71(F), the court did determine that this particular set of facts
did not give rise to a scrivener's error and held in favor of the
owners' association, also awarding the association its attorneys'
fees.' 0 o The court elaborated on its finding as follows:
The alleged error was neither typographical nor clerical. There was
no finding that AES, the scrivener, had transposed a call in the
metes and bounds description, recited an erroneous deed book reference or similar error commonly recognized as a scrivener's error. Instead, the trial court specifically found that there was no drafting error, but instead, based its judgment only on the LLC's intent that
Parcel 11A should not have been included in the condominium prop10
erty.

F. Restrictive Covenants
Residents of a subdivision argued that the restrictive covenants
encumbering the subdivision prohibited the pasturing of a horse
in the subdivision property or, alternatively, that such pasturing
constituted a nuisance per se in Turner v. Caplan.10 2 The covenants at issue expressly restricted the subdivision's lots to residential purposes and also prohibited the "raising or harboring of
livestock or poultry;" however, they explicitly exempted certain
lots, including the lots in question, from the livestock and poultry
prohibition. 10 3 The trial court agreed the restrictive covenants
prohibited the pasturing, found the potential exemption from the
covenant to be void for unreasonableness, and held the pasturing
constituted a nuisance per se.' 4

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 571, 621 S.E.2d at 116.
Id. at 572, 621 S.E.2d at 116-17.
Id. at 574, 621 S.E.2d at 118.
Id. at 579, 621 S.E.2d at 120-21.
Id. at 577, 621 S.E.2d at 120.
268 Va. 122, 596 S.E.2d 525 (2004).
Id. at 126, 596 S.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 125-27, 596 S.E.2d at 527-28.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:257

The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the exemption
from the covenant prohibiting livestock did apply, however, and
held that the trial court committed plain error in finding said exemption to be void for unreasonableness. 105 The court stated that
"while we are aware of case law holding that use of property may
not be unreasonably restricted, counsel and the trial court cite no
cases applying the concept of 'unreasonability' to the exemptions
specifically allowing the use of restricted land for particular purposes."106
In addition, the supreme court reversed the trial court's finding
that the horse's pasturing constituted a nuisance per se; the trial
court's interpretation of "nuisance per se" was "too broad."0 7
"'[W]hile there is some confusion in the books as to the meaning
of the term nuisance per se, the tendency of modern times is to
restrict its use to such things as are nuisances at all times and
under all circumstances,"' clarified the supreme court. 0 8 According to the court, that the restrictive covenants prohibited livestock on other lots within the subdivision was irrelevant. The
court added: "[L]aw of nuisance exists independently of restrictive
covenants. The fact that a prohibition upon maintaining a nuisance is found in a covenant adds nothing to the analysis of
whether facts presented constitute a nuisance."' °9 Instead, wrote
the court:
In all such cases the question is whether the nuisance complained of
will or does produce such a condition of things as, in the judgment of
reasonable [persons], is naturally productive of actual physical discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities and of ordinary tastes
and habits, and as, in view of the circumstances of the case, is
[un] reasonable and in derogation of the rights of the complainant. 110

The dispositive issue in Barris v. Keswick Homes, L.L.C. 11' was
"whether the circuit court correctly ruled that a particular lot in a
residential subdivision is no longer subject to a restrictive cove-

105. Id. at 126-27, 596 S.E.2d at 527-28.
106. Id., 596 S.E.2d at 528 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 128, 596 S.E.2d at 528-29.
108. Id., 596 S.E.2d at 528 (quoting Price v. Travis, 149 Va. 536, 547, 140 S.E. 644, 647
(1927)).
109. Id. at 127, 596 S.E.2d at 528.
110. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 496-97, 140 S.E.
656, 660 (1927)).
111. 268 Va. 67, 597 S.E.2d 54 (2004).
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nant prohibiting the resubdivision of lots in that subdivision."11' 2
The covenants at issue, recorded in 1948, stated, "'[tihere shall be
no resubdivision of any of said lots, without the written consent of
three-fourths of the then owners of lots in said subdivision."'1 1 3 In
1984, three-fourths of the then owners recorded an instrument
which "vacated and released" Lot 7 from the subdivision restriction; the parcel Keswick Homes sought to subdivide was created
following subdivision of Lot 7 pursuant to this instrument. 114
"Generally," explained the Supreme Court of Virginia, "a restrictive covenant cannot be modified or terminated except by
115
agreement of all the parties entitled to enforce the covenant."
"However," continued the court, "the covenant may provide for a
mechanism by which the parties, or some number of them, may
modify or terminate the restriction."11 6 Keswick Homes argued
that the covenant in the instant case allowed residents to exempt
property from its restrictions in perpetuity and that the 1984 instrument did just that. 1 17 Conversely, the other subdivision residents argued that the covenant permitted three-fourths of the
then-owners to consent to a one-time waiver of the restriction." 8
Following its de novo review of the covenants, the supreme court
held that they did not provide "the authority to grant a perpetual
release of a lot from the covenant."1 9 Therefore, the subdivision
residents were not estopped from enforcing the subdivision prohibition. 2 0
G. Land Use
In Board of Supervisors v. Board of Zoning Appeals,'2 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether boards of supervisors
have standing to challenge the decisions made by boards of zon-

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 69, 597 S.E.2d at 55.
Id.
Id. at 69-70, 597 S.E.2d at 55-56.
Id. at 71, 597 S.E.2d at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71-72, 597 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 72-73, 597 S.E.2d at 57-58.
See id. at 73, 597 S.E.2d at 58.
268 Va. 441, 604 S.E.2d 7 (2004).
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ing appeals. 122 The Board of Supervisors in this case challenged
the Board of Zoning Appeals's grant of a variance for the subdivision of property when the resulting parcels would not comply
with Fairfax County's minimum square footage and lot width requirements.12 3 The Board of Supervisors claimed standing under
Virginia Code section 15.2-2314, which states in pertinent part:
Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision
of the board of zoning appeals, or any aggrieved taxpayer or any officer, department, board or bureau of the locality, may file with the
clerk of the circuit court for the county or city a petition specifying
the grounds on which aggrieved. 124

The supreme court was compelled by the Board of Supervisors's
"strong interest in the proper and uniform application of its zoning ordinances." 1 25 "Without question," worried the court, "improper decisions of a board of zoning appeals can impede the uniform and proper application of zoning ordinances and the grant of
improper variances can undermine and even destroy the very
126
goals that the zoning classifications were enacted to achieve."
The supreme court considered the implications of its holding in
the following passage:
Code § 15.2-1404 grants a local governing board the broad power to
institute actions in its own name with regard to "all matters connected with its duties." One legislative purpose manifested in this
statutory grant is to enable the local governing body to ensure compliance with its legislative enactments, including its zoning ordinance. If the local governing body does not have such authority, that
body's legislative acts could be effectively nullified by a BZA, and the
governing body would be powerless to take action to require compliance with its own ordinances. Moreover, a holding that would preclude a board of supervisors from seeking judicial review of a decision of a board of zoning appeals would enable a board of zoning
appeals to exercise power arbitrarily. Certainly, the
27 General Assembly did not contemplate such an untenable result. 1

"[C]onsistent with the majority rule adopted by our sister states,"
the court ultimately held that a board of supervisors is an "ag-

122. Id. at 444, 604 S.E.2d at 8.
123. Id.
124.

VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Cum. Supp. 2006).

125. Bd. of Supervisors, 268 Va.at 446, 604 S.E.2d at 9.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1404 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006)).
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grieved person" under Virginia Code section 15.2-2314 and therefore has standing to challenge decisions of a board of zoning ap-

peals. 128
Turning to the issue of whether the Board of Zoning Appeals
properly granted the variance at issue, the supreme court reiterated a recent rule of law: "[A] board of zoning appeals has author1 29
ity to grant variances only to avoid an unconstitutional result."
The court found no undue hardship under the instant facts, and
thus, no valid justification for the Board of Zoning Appeals's
0
grant of a variance. 13
The landowner merely sought the variance
to "demolish the current structure on his property, subdivide his
property into two lots, and erect new residential structures on
each lot."'' According to the supreme court, the landowner's "inability to subdivide his property does not constitute hardship under the facts of this case."132 The court added that "[tihe effect of
the zoning ordinance does not interfere 'with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole.""3 3 As a result, the
supreme court vacated the Board of Zoning Appeals's grant of the
variance and entered final judgment in the Board of Supervisors's

favor. 134
Shilling v. Jimenez 3 ' presented the Supreme Court of Virginia
with the following issue: "[WIhether a landowner, aggrieved by
the local governing body's approval of a subdivision of neighboring lands, may attack that approval indirectly by suit against the
subdividers and their successors in title."'3 6 Neighbors filed a bill
of compliant alleging that affidavits made by subdividers in connection with a subdivision application were false and intended to
circumvent the application of certain zoning provisions, resulting
37
in the "wrongful approval" of subdivision to their detriment. 1

128. Id.
129. Id. at 452, 604 S.E.2d at 12 (citing Cochran v. Fairfax County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 267 Va. 756, 764, 594 S.E.2d 571, 576 (2004)).
130. Id. at 453, 604 S.E.2d at 13.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Cochran, 267 Va. at 766, 594 S.E.2d at 578).
134. Id.
135. 268 Va. 202, 597 S.E.2d 206 (2004).
136. Id. at 204, 597 S.E.2d at 207.
137. Id. at 205-06, 597 S.E.2d at 208.
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For the basis of their cause of action, the neighbors relied on a
local ordinance, which provides, "'Any person aggrieved by the interpretation, administration, or enforcement of these regulations
as they apply to a subdivision . .. application may petition the
Circuit Court of Loudoun County as provided by law,"' 138 and on
Virginia Code section 15.2-2255, which provides that the "administration and enforcement of subdivision regulations .. shall
be vested in the governing body of the locality," and "[e]xcept as
provided above, the governing body shall be responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of the subdivision regu' 3
lations through its local planning commission or otherwise. 1
The neighbors argued that the phrase "or otherwise" in Virginia
Code section 15.2-2255 implies a power on behalf of the local government to supply aggrieved persons the right to challenge subdivision approval in local circuit courts.' 40
The supreme court disagreed, stating "[tihe phrase 'or otherwise' is not an express grant of power to the governing body to
create a third-party right of action, and it does not give rise to
such a grant by necessary implication."' 4 ' The court seemed
swayed by public policy considerations in making its decision,
stating that: "Third-party suits challenging subdivisions long after their approval and recordation could have a profound effect on
the vested property rights of innocent purchasers and lenders. We
will not impute to the General Assembly an intent to create such
an effect in the absence of express statutory language."1 42
H. Mechanic's Liens
Britt Construction, Inc. v. Magazzine Clean, LLC 4 3 required
the Supreme Court of Virginia to determine whether a mechanic's
lien had been properly perfected under the Virginia Code's requirements for the same. Specifically, the dispositive issue was

138. Id.

at 206, 597 S.E.2d at 209 (quoting LOUDOUN COUNTY, VA., CODIFIED
§ 1242.04(1)(a) (2005), available at http://inetdocs.loudoun.gov/b&d/docs/
landsubdivision /landsubdivisionlandsubdivision.doc).
139. Id. at 207, 597 S.E.2d at 209 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2255 (Repl. Vol. 2003
& Cum. Supp. 2006)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 208, 597 S.E.2d at 210.
142. Id.
143. 271 Va. 58, 623 S.E.2d 886 (2006).
ORDINANCES
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"whether Code § 43-4 requires that a general contractor, as a
condition of perfecting a mechanic's lien, contemporaneously file
with the memorandum of lien a 'certification' that a copy of the
memorandum has been mailed to the property owner." 14 In pertinent part, this statute provides:
A general contractor. . . in order to perfect the lien given by § 43-3
...shall file a memorandum of lien at any time after the work is
commenced or material furnished, but not later than 90 days from
the last day of the month in which he last performs labor or furnishes material, and in no event later than 90 days from the time
such building ... is completed, or the work thereon otherwise terminated.... A lien claimant who is a general contractorshall also file
along with the memorandum of lien, a certification of mailing of a
copy of the memorandum of 45
lien on the owner of the property at the
owner's last known address.1

Britt Construction recorded twelve memoranda of mechanic's
liens, but failed to mail copies of the memoranda to Magazzine
Clean and to file certifications of mailing. 146 In Britt Construction's view, perfection occurred as a result of the recordation, and
the mailing and certification requirements did not affect recordation; instead, these latter requirements were merely notice provisions, compliance with which should be liberally construed by the
courts.

147

Noting that mechanic's lien statutes are in derogation of the
common law and thus must be strictly construed,1 4 8 the supreme
court held that Virginia Code section 43-3 was plain and unambiguous and does in fact require that a general contractor file a certification that he has mailed a copy of the memorandum of lien to
the property owner at the last known address. 149 As a result, Britt
Construction's purported mechanic's lien was not properly per50
fected. 1

144. Id. at 60, 623 S.E.2d at 887.
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Cum. Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
146. Britt Constr., Inc., 271 Va. at 61, 623 S.E.2d at 887.
147. See id. at 62, 623 S.E.2d at 887-88.
148. Id. at 63, 623 S.E.2d at 888. The court added that a "mechanic's lien must be perfected within the specific time frame and in the manner set forth in the statutes, or the
lien will be lost." Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 64, 623 S.E.2d at 889.
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I. Annexation
In Allfirst Trust Co. v. County of Loudoun, 15 ' the Supreme
Court of Virginia examined the statutory elements of landowner
initiated annexation proceedings. Virginia Code section 15.23203(A) allows fifty-one percent of the "owners of real estate in
number and in land area in a designated area" adjacent to any
city or town to petition the circuit court for annexation to any
such city or town.15 2 The petitioners in this case sought annexation of their non-contiguous tracts into the Town of Leesburg, arguing that the Virginia Code did not require their parcels be contiguous and that they met the statutory requirement by treating
certain 3 non-contiguous parcels together as the "designated
, 15
area."
The supreme court adamantly disagreed, holding that "where
landowners seek to initiate annexation proceedings under Code §
15.2-3203 that include non-contiguous territories, they must constitute 51% of the 'owners of real estate in number and land area'
within each separate territory" and that the aforementioned
statutory requirement is jurisdictional.15 4 The "obvious purpose"
of this requirement, wrote the court, is "to ensure that the annexation is favored by the majority of the landowners, both in
numbers and in acreage, in the area affected by it," and "a noncontinguous area, in which the majority may oppose the annexation, is not swept into it by the sheer force of numbers in the area
in which it is favored." 155
J. Landlord/ Tenant
In Carter v. Meadowgreen Associates,15 6 the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered the issue of whether the family member of a
tenant succeeds to such tenant's rights and obligations upon the
tenant's death when that family member occupies the leased
premises with the landlord's consent. The plaintiff, the minor son

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

268 Va. 428, 601 S.E.2d 612 (2004).
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-3203(A) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
See Allfirst Trust Co., 268 Va. at 433, 601 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 436, 601 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
268 Va. 215, 597 S.E.2d 82 (2004).
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of the deceased tenant, continued to reside in his mother's leased
apartment after her death, without paying rent, and the landlord
continued to collect a subsidy for the rent from the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development's Section 8 housing
program. 157 The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to succeed
to his mother's rights to the
month-to-month tenancy under the
8
aforementioned program. 15

However, the supreme court disagreed, finding Congress to be
silent as to the issue, and determined, therefore, that state law
controlled.' 59 "In Virginia, the death of a tenant for a fixed term
does not terminate a lease in effect at the time of death," stated
the court. 160 Instead, the "deceased tenant's interest passes to her
estate, and her personal representative becomes liable for the
rent until the end of the term."' 6 ' In light of the foregoing rule of
law, the court held that the plaintiff did not succeed to the deceased tenant's rights under the lease upon her death, noting also
that he failed to show any evidence of authority to retain the
leased premises as a subtenant of the deceased's estate.162
III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

A. Eminent Domain
Where condemned property becomes surplus within the fifteen
years of condemnation, the condemner must offer to sell the property to the former owner or certain related parties.'63 Previously,
under Virginia law, the former owner of condemned property
could waive this right of offer of repurchase.164 However, Virginia
Code section 25.1-108 now provides that "[t]he right to the offer of

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 217, 597 S.E.2d at 83.
Id. at 218-19, 597 S.E.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 219, 597 S.E.2d at 84.
Id.
Id. (citing Hutchings v. Commercial Bank, 91 Va. 68, 77, 20 S.E. 950, 953 (1895)).
Id.
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-108(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
164. Act of Jan. 31, 2005, ch. 2, 2005 Va. Acts 1 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1108(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
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repurchase cannot be waived and any contractual provision or
agreement waiving such rights is void and unenforceable."' 6 5
In 2006, the General Assembly added Virginia Code section
25.1-205.1, which requires that a court refer the parties to condemnation proceedings to a mandatory dispute resolution orientation66 upon the filing of the petition initiating the condemnation.
The General Assembly also modified several sections of the Virginia Code to remove landowners' rights to have eminent domain
cases heard by commissioners. 167 As a result,
eminent domain
61
courts.'
or
juries
by
heard
be
cases may only
B. Virginia Condominium Act
Revisions to Virginia Code section 55-79.43 of the Condominium Act convey authority to the condominium declarant "to execute, file, and process any subdivision, site plan, zoning, or other
land use applications or disclosures, including conditional zoning
proffers and agreements incidental thereto that do not create an
affirmative obligation on the unit owners' association without its
consent" until the declarant control period expires, so long as the
declarant has the 6right
to create additional units or complete
9
common elements. 1
Virginia Code section 55-79.79, which provides for certain
minimum warranties of condominium declarants to unit owners,
now prohibits any action for breach against a declarant:
[U]nless a written statement by the claimant or his agent, attorney
or representative, of the nature of the alleged defect has been sent to
the declarant ... more than six months prior to the commencement
of the action giving the declarant an opportunity to cure the alleged
defect within a reasonable time. 170

165. VA.CODE ANN. § 25.1-108(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
166. Act of Mar. 31, 2006, ch. 415, 2006 Va. Acts _
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
25.1-205.1 (Repl. Vol. 2006)).
167. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 586, 2006 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 25.1-100, -209, -213, -214, -219, -220, -228, -229, -235, -318, 62.1-98 (Repl. Vol.
2006) and VA. CODE ANN. § 36-27 (Supp. 2006)).
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-220 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
169. Act of Feb. 23, 2006, ch. 9, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-79.43(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.79(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
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C. Land Use
Virginia Code section 15.2-2209, relating to civil penalties for
violations of zoning ordinances, was amended by the 2006 General Assembly to increase the fine for an initial summons from
$100 to $200 and from not more than $250 to not more than $500
for each additional summons.' 7
New language in Virginia Code section 15.2-2314, relating to
appeals of decisions of boards of zoning appeals, provides that
courts are to hear arguments on questions of law de novo. 172 Findings and conclusions of the board as to questions of fact, however,
are still presumed correct. 173
The General Assembly added language to Virginia Code section
15.2-2307, which allows zoning ordinances to require that when
certain improvements are damaged or destroyed by a natural disaster or an act of God, the improvements be repaired, rebuilt, or
replaced in such a way as to "eliminate or reduce the nonconforming features to the extent possible." 74
Virginia Code section 15.2-2309, relating to the powers and duties of boards of zoning appeals, now states that "the property
upon which a property owner has been granted a variance shall
be treated as conforming for all purposes under state law and local ordinance." 175 However, it also now provides that "the use of
the structure permitted by the variance may not be expanded." 76
New Virginia Code section 15.2-2244.1 allows localities to include provisions in their subdivision zoning ordinances to permit
"a single division of a lot or parcel for the purpose of sale or gift to
a member of the immediate family" where (1) the property owner
has owned the property for at least fifteen years, and (2) the property owner restricts the transfer of the property to a nonmember
of the immediate family for fifteen years. 17

171.
ANN. §
172.
173.
174.
ANN. §
175.
176.
177.

Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 248, 2006 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
15.2-2209 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
Id.
Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 244, 2006 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
15.2-2307 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309(2)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
Id.
Id. § 15.2-2241 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
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D. Landlord!Tenant
The 2005 General Assembly added subsection "C" to Virginia
Code section 55-248.37, which addresses periodic tenancies and
holdover remedies.17' The new section provides that the terms of
the terminated agreement remain in effect during the period of
the hold-over tenancy "except that the amount of rent shall be either as provided in the terminated rental agreement
or the
179
tenant."
the
to
notice
written
a
in
forth
set
amount
If a tenant who is the sole occupant of a residential apartment
unit dies, and no person is authorized by the circuit court to handle the deceased tenant's probate matters, Virginia Code section
55-248.38:3 allows the landlord, upon ten days written notice to
certain enumerated persons or to the tenant, to dispose of a deceased tenant's personal property located on the leased premises
or in a landlord-provided storage area. 0
The 2006 General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to allow landlords to seek an award of attorneys' fees and other civil
recovery as damages in an unlawful detainer action filed pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-126."'
E. Miscellaneous
Virginia Code section 55-20.2 addresses property held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. 812 Previously, this section allowed only the principal family residence held in this manner to be conveyed to a joint trust. 83 It has been amended to
provide that "any property" held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties may be conveyed to a joint trust. 184
New Virginia Code section 55-50.2 deems all appurtenant and
gross utility easements recorded on or after July 1, 2006 to "touch

178. Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 805, 2005 Va. Acts 1340 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-248.37(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.37(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
180. Id. § 55-248.38:3 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
181. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 628, 2006 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.31(F) (Cum.Supp. 2006)).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
183. Id. § 55-20.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
184. Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 281, 2006 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-20.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
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and concern the servient tract, to run with the servient tract, its
successors, and assigns for the benefit of the entity providing the
utility services, its successors, and assigns.""'5
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the past two years, Virginians have seen a number of important judicial decisions by the commonwealth's highest court in the
area of real estate law, including cases addressing easements, adverse possession, prescription, taxation, property owners' associations, restrictive covenants, mechanics' liens and landlord/tenant
issues. Both the courts and the General Assembly devoted a great
deal of attention to zoning matters as Virginians and their businesses sought further control over land use through the courts
and through their legislative representatives. In addition, the
Virginia Condominium Act.. 6 continues to be a fertile ground for
legislative changes and judicial decisions in the wake of an increased number of condominium applications in recent years.

185.
186.

VA. CODE ANN. § 55-50.2 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
Id. §§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2006).

